Law enforcement in China
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Law enforcement in China consists of an extensive public security system and a variety of enforcement procedures used to maintain order in the country. Along with the courts and procuratorates, the country's judicial and public security agencies include the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the Ministry of State Security (MSS), with their descending hierarchy of departments, bureaus (局, "Jú"), subbureaus (副局, "Fù jú"), and stations (所, "Suǒ").
Hong Kong and Macau have separate law enforcement agencies, different legal systems and are classified as separate jurisdictions under the one country two systems framework. However, the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) and Public Security Police Force often cooperate with the mainland MPS on cases involving cross border crime.
Overview
[edit]The national security system is made up of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the People's Armed Police (PAP), the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and the state judicial, procuratorial, and penal systems. The Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission vets all law enforcement officers and legal officials for political reliability.[1]
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) oversees all domestic police activity in China. The ministry is responsible for police operations and detention centers and has dedicated departments for internal political, economic, and communications security. Its lowest organizational units are public security stations, which maintain a close day-to-day contact with the public. The People's Armed Police Force, with its 1.5 million personnel, is organized into 45 divisions. These include security police, border defense personnel, guards for government buildings and embassies, and police communications specialists.
Ministry of State Security (MSS) was established in 1983 to ensure "the security of the state through effective measures against enemy agents, spies, and counterrevolutionary activities designed to sabotage or overthrow China's socialist system." The ministry is guided by a series of laws enacted in 1993, 1994, and 1997 that replaced the "counterrevolutionary" crime statutes. The ministry's operations include intelligence collection, both domestic and foreign. Authorities have used arrests on charges of revealing state secrets, subversion, and common crimes to suppress political dissent and social advocacy.
The Ministry of Justice maintains oversees the operation of prisons.
The Security Bureau is the local security department for Hong Kong. The paramilitary style Hong Kong Police Force was established in 1844 during the British occupation of Hong Kong and has 27,375 uniformed personnel and 4,885 civilian staff. Hong Kong Correctional Service was established in 1879 and has 6,659 uniformed personnel and civilian staff. Both services report to the Security Bureau.
Secretariat for Security (Macau) is the local security department in Macau. Macau Security Force (established in 1999 by the merger of the Judiciary Police Unitary Police Service, Macau Prisons) is a force of 3,700 personnel and reports to the local Security department.
Judicial system
[edit]Key organizations
[edit]Ministry of Public Security
[edit]People's Armed Police
[edit]Urban Administration and Law Enforcement Bureaus
[edit]Cities in China often have uniformed, but unarmed, urban management officers often referred to as "Chengguan" (城管; lit: "City Management Officers") under the control of the municipal governments of each province. Chengguan are hired and employed by the Urban Administrative and Law Enforcement Bureaus of local governments. They are usual civil servants acting as parapolice and do have formal police or law enforcement powers. The agency is in charge with enforcement of urban management of the city. This includes enforcing local bylaws on city appearance, environmental, sanitation, work safety, pollution control and health. Additionally, their duties also involve enforcement of planning, greening, industry and commerce regulations, environment protection, municipal affairs and water in large cities.
Since the establishment of the Chengguan in 2001/2002, there have been numerous cases of Chengguan in cities across China using excessive violence and abuse of power. Numerous incidents have occurred over the years involving Chengguan seriously wounding innocents and even beating people to death in public.[11] Chengguan are known to have a notorious reputation due to corruption and nepotism in their hiring, training and recruitment and is the source of much resentment among local Chinese. In recent years efforts have been made to ameliorate the tense relation between the Chengguan and the general public, with mixed results.
Police vehicles
[edit]Police cars in the mainland are white with a dark blue swoosh painted on the side such as BYD e6.[12] China does not have a uniform fleet buying program so local departments typically buy from a variety of local dealerships. Volkswagen Santanas and Volkswagen Passats are the most common but other makes and models are present as well.
Hong Kong Police vehicles have been influenced by British and Chinese schemes and still today retain them. Police in Macau use generic European design patterns.
Historical background
[edit]However much the public security system may have been influenced by communist ideology and practice, it remained rooted directly in the traditional Chinese concept of governmental control through imposed collective responsibility. Even in the pre-imperial era, a system was proposed to organize the people into "groups of families which would be mutually responsible for each other's good behavior and share each other's punishments." The Qin (221-207 BCE) and Han (206 BCE-CE 220) dynasties made use of the concept, and the Song dynasty (960–1279) institutionalized it on a nationwide basis in the bao jia (tithing) system. It entailed the organization of family households into groups of ten, each unit being organized successively into a larger unit up to the county level of administration. Each family sent a representative to the monthly meeting of its unit, and each unit elected a leader to represent it at the next higher level. Since the head of each unit was responsible to the next higher level for the conduct of all members of his unit, the system served as an extension of the central government. Eventually, each group of families also was required to furnish men to serve in the militia. Bao jia, which alternately flourished or languished under later rulers and usually existed more in theory than in practice, was reinstituted during the Qing dynasty (1644–1911).
During the Qing period, the people's aversion to legalistic procedures and the rulers' preferences for socially and collectively imposed sanctions continued. Technically, the magistrate was to hear even minor criminal cases; but local elders and village leaders were allowed to handle most disputes, freeing the magistrate for more important work and saving the government expense. The people preferred to handle matters in this way, outside the intimidating court system.
Other practices for maintaining public order in China during the imperial era included the formation of mutual aid groups of farm households, which over time came to assume police functions. In a manner similar to twentieth-century means of ideological control, the Qing bureaucracy organized mass lectures that stressed the Confucian principle of obedience. Still another traditional form of policing was the appointment of censors to investigate corruption and misconduct up to the highest levels of government. Doing that job too well cost many censors their lives.
In 1932 Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT) government reinstituted the bao jia system. In the KMT's revised bao jia system, in addition to the chief, there were two officers of importance within each 100-family unit. The population officer maintained the records and reported all births, deaths, marriages, moves, and unlawful activities to the district office. The bao jia troop commander headed a self-defense unit and was responsible for maintaining law and order. In rural China, however, the local village was generally a self-contained world, and the peasants remained aloof from distant and higher-ranking centers of authority.
The Japanese were introduced to the bao jia system on Taiwan when they assumed control of the island after the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), and they found the system highly suitable for administering occupied areas. They instituted modified versions of it in north China after 1937. The Japanese imposed severe restrictions on the population, and the system aided in taking the census, restricting movement, and conducting spot checks. Each household had to affix a wooden tablet on the front door with the names of all inhabitants inscribed. Anyone missing or not on the list during an inspection by Japanese troops was assumed to be an insurgent. Since there were not as many Japanese troops in south China as in the north, the local leaders assisted the Japanese in administering the areas. They also disseminated propaganda at neighborhood meetings and established self-defense and youth corps.
The Communists were themselves products of Chinese society, and when they came to power in 1949 they liberally borrowed from these historical examples. They extensively organized the population and maintained the principles of mutual surveillance and mutual responsibility. They also retained the concept of self-defense forces. Communist control, however, exceeded that of bao jia or any other traditional system and extended into virtually every household. Under communist rule, the family was not considered an effective control mechanism. To achieve near-total control, a large number of administrative agencies and social organizations were established or adapted. Police forces resembling the Soviet police in organization, power, and activities were organized with the aid of Soviet advisers.
From 1949 to 1953, the newly established government of the People's Republic made use of the PLA, militia units made up of demobilized soldiers and other civilians, the police, and loyal citizens to put down resistance and establish order. Remnants of the Republic of China Armed Forces remained in pockets on the mainland, and communist efforts to enforce tax laws and agricultural rules provoked disturbances and riots. Extending responsibility for public order to include the police, military, and citizenry proved to be a highly effective arrangement, and the concept was written into the Common Program that preceded the 1954 state constitution.
The PLA and the militia continued to share responsibility for internal security and public order under the 1954 state constitution. The PLA's involvement in internal affairs was most extensive during the more turbulent period of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). Mao Zedong, perceiving that the public security cadres were protecting precisely the party leaders he wished to purge, directed youthful Red Guards to crush the police, courts, and procuratorates as well. The minister of public security, Luo Ruiqing (who concurrently served as the chief of Joint staff), was purged, soon followed by heads of the courts and procuratorates.
Initially, the military tried to remain uninvolved. But on Mao's orders, the PLA, which had once been told to support (actually to acquiesce to) the Red Guards, moved in to quell the chaos that Mao had inspired. The PLA gradually took over public security functions by establishing military control committees to replace the government bureaucracy. Revolutionary committees were set up as provincial-level and local administrative organs, usually with a PLA cadre in charge, and order gradually returned. By the summer of 1968 the Red Guards were being disbanded, and mass trials were used to punish and intimidate rioters.
With nineteen of China's twenty-nine provincial-level people's revolutionary committees headed by PLA commanders, the military again was in charge of administration and security throughout the country, but it badly needed help from experienced police officers. A policy of leniency toward most former officials evolved, and some public security cadres returned to work. The PLA also recruited inexperienced people to form auxiliary police units. These units were mass organizations with a variety of names reflecting their factional orientation. Perhaps the best known unit was the "Attack with Reason, Defend with Force Corps" named for the militant slogan of Mao's wife, Jiang Qing. Public security forces were composed largely of non-professionals and lacked the disciplined informant networks and personnel dossiers previously used to maintain order.
Beginning in 1968, the authorities called upon the PLA to help remove millions of urban dwellers from the overcrowded cities and relocate them to the countryside and to transport cashiered officials to special cadre schools for indoctrination and labor. The migration to the country mostly involved students and other youths for whom there were not enough jobs or places in the school system within the cities. Yet despite the discontent these campaigns caused, reported crime declined after 1970. Increased concern over the threat from the Soviet Union in the wake of armed clashes on the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 forced the PLA gradually to return to barracks, and control of the country reverted to the civilian leadership.
The Beijing-based Central Security Regiment, also known as the 8341 Unit, was an important PLA law enforcement element. It was responsible over the years for the personal security of Mao Zedong and other party and state leaders. More than a bodyguard force, it also operated a nationwide intelligence network to uncover plots against Mao or any incipient threat to the leadership. The unit reportedly was deeply involved in undercover activities, discovering electronic listening devices in Mao's office and performing surveillance of his rivals. The 8341 Unit participated in the late 1976 arrest of the Gang of Four, but it reportedly was deactivated soon after that event.
The militia also participated in maintaining public order in the 1970s. Their involvement was especially evident in the 1973-76 period. In 1973 the Gang of Four, concerned over the transformation of the PLA into a more professional, less political, military force, took control of the urban militia from the PLA and placed it under local party committees loyal to them. For the next three years, the urban militia was used extensively to enforce radical political and social policies. It was the urban militia, along with the public security forces, that broke up the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square honoring the memory of Zhou Enlai in April 1976 — the event that served as the pretext for the second purge of Deng Xiaoping. At the time, in rural areas the militia was more under the control of the PLA.
Public security officials also made extensive use of the authority granted them to impose administrative sanctions by two sets of documents. These were the 1957 Regulations on Reeducation Through Labor, which were reissued in 1979 with amendments, and the 1957 Regulations Governing Offenses Against Public Order, which were rescinded and replaced in 1986 by regulations of the same name. Offenders under the Regulations on Reeducation Through Labor might include "vagabonds, people who have no proper occupation, and people who repeatedly breach public order." The police could apprehend such individuals and sentence them to reeducation through labor with the approval of local labor-training administration committees. The 1957 regulations placed no limit on the length of sentences, but beginning in the early 1960s three or four years was the norm. The 1979 amended regulations, however, limited the length of reeducation through labor to three years with possible extension for extraordinary cases. The Regulations Governing Offenses Against Public Order empowered the police to admonish, fine, or detain people for up to fifteen days. Goods illegally in the possession of an offender were to be confiscated, and payment was imposed for damages or hospital fees in the event injury had been caused.
Illegal drug trafficking
[edit]See also
[edit]- Crime in China
- Court system of the People's Republic of China
- Law of the People's Republic of China
- Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China
- People's Armed Police
- Ministry of State Security of the People's Republic of China
- Ministry of Justice of the People's Republic of China
- Terrorism in the People's Republic of China
- Custody and repatriation 1982 -2003
- Secretariat for Security (Macau)
- Macau Security Force
- Law enforcement in Hong Kong
- Judiciary of Hong Kong
- Department of Justice (Hong Kong)
- Judiciary of Macau
- Legal system of Macau
- Secretary for Justice (Macau)
Notes
[edit]- ^ Mandarin pronunciation: [kʊ́ŋ.án.pû]; abbr. from Chinese: 公共安全部; pinyin: Gōnggòng Ānquán Bù; lit. 'Public Security Ministry' Mandarin pronunciation: [kʊ́ŋ.kʊ̂ŋ án.tɕʰɥɛ̌n pû]
- ^ abbreviation: PAP; Chinese: 中国人民武装警察部队; pinyin: Zhōngguó Rénmín Wǔzhuāng Jǐngchá Bùduì
References
[edit]Citations
[edit]- ^ "How China stifles dissent without a KGB or Stasi of its own". The Economist. February 15, 2024. ISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved 2024-02-15.
- ^ Ahl, Björn (2019-05-06). "Judicialization in authoritarian regimes: The expansion of powers of the Chinese Supreme People's Court". International Journal of Constitutional Law. 17 (1): 252–277. doi:10.1093/icon/moz003. ISSN 1474-2640.
- ^ ""Walking on Thin Ice" - Control, Intimidation and Harassment of Lawyers in China". Human Rights Watch. April 28, 2008. Archived from the original on September 16, 2023. Retrieved June 19, 2024.
- ^ Joske, Alex (2022-01-25). "Secret police: The Ministry of Public Security's clandestine foreign operations" (PDF). Sinopsis. Archived (PDF) from the original on January 25, 2022. Retrieved 2022-03-02.
- ^ Lulu, Jichang; Jirouš, Filip (2022-02-21). "Back to the Cheka: The Ministry of Public Security's political protection work" (PDF). Sinopsis. Archived (PDF) from the original on February 21, 2022. Retrieved 2022-03-02.
The CCP security apparatus exploits foreign perceptions of the MPS as equivalent to their own police to further its state security mission. Foreign judiciaries and law enforcement agencies cooperating with the MPS and other organs in the CCP political and legal system become ancillary to the protection of the party's political security.
- ^ Schwarck, Edward (July 2018). "Intelligence and Informatization: The Rise of the Ministry of Public Security in Intelligence Work in China". The China Journal. 80: 1–23. doi:10.1086/697089. ISSN 1324-9347. S2CID 149764208.
- ^ "Military Services – Ministry of National Defense". eng.mod.gov.cn. Retrieved 2024-04-20.
- ^ Sun, Ivan Y.; Wu, Yuning (December 2009). "The Role of the People's Armed Police in Chinese Policing". Asian Journal of Criminology. 4 (2): 107–128. doi:10.1007/s11417-008-9059-y. ISSN 1871-0131. S2CID 143891785.
- ^ "Top legislature passes armed police law". China Daily. 2009-08-27. Archived from the original on 2021-08-31. Retrieved 2019-10-04.
- ^ Blasko, Dennis J. (2006). The Chinese Army today : tradition and transformation for the 21st century (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. ISBN 0415770025. OCLC 68694731.
- ^ "China arrests over beating death". BBC News. 2008-01-09. Archived from the original on 2019-07-28. Retrieved 2010-01-02.
- ^ "BYD delivers 500 e6 pure electric police cars to Shenzhen Public Security Bureau". BYD. January 10, 2013. Archived from the original on February 21, 2018. Retrieved February 21, 2018.
Sources
[edit]- This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain. China: A Country Study. Federal Research Division. Government and Politics.
- Kam C. Wong, Chinese Policing: History and Reform (N.Y.: Peter Lang, 2009)
- Kam C. Wong, Police Reform in China (Taylor and Francis, 2011)
- Kam C. Wong, Cyberspace Governance in China (Nova Science Publisher, 2011)